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Abstract
Following the Sunnylands summit, the U.S.-China relationship
has been gradually improving. Yet divergences in ideology, national
security concerns, and national interests between the United States
and China still exist. Since the summit, there has been friction over
territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea, the
Snowden episode, Taiwan’s international participation, and arms
procurement. Therefore, their relationship will still be cooperative,
competitive, and sometimes conflicted in the near future.
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I. The Sunnylands Summit
U.S. President Barack Obama and the PRC’s President Xi Jinping
had a two-day summit at California’s Sunnylands on June 7th and
8th, 2013. It was the first opportunity for the two world leaders to
meet in such an informal way in quite a long time. They exchanged
points of view on bilateral relations and regional and global issues.
The meeting attracted global attention for several reasons. First,
the two countries are the world’s strongest powers, and a meeting
between their two leaders will always have a worldwide impact, es-
pecially because they can be expected to discuss global and regional
security issues. Secondly, the United States is the world’s only super-
power, while China is an emerging power. The two countries differ
in ideology, national strategy, global and regional security focuses,
and bilateral political, economic and security issues. They need to
work their differences out for the sake of maintaining a stable rela-
tionship. Thirdly, both leaders have fairly recently taken office. They
need to develop a mutual understanding and create a friendly rela-
tionship given that the outcome of this and their future summits will
affect their countries’ future relations.1
Prior to the event, U.S. official sources stated that the Sunnylands
summit was only an informal meeting between the two presidents,
and should not raise expectations about any official agreements
reached by them. The most important aim of this summit was to build
up mutual trust between Obama and Xi. U.S. National Security
Advisor Tom Donilon said that this event was reminiscent of the
Kenneth G. Lieberthal, “U.S.-China Relations: The Obama-Xi California Summit,”
Brookings, June 3, 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/pos-
ts/2013/06/03-us-china-relations-obama-xi-california-summit-lieberthal>.
U.S.-China Relations after the Obama-Xi Summit─A Perspective from Taiwan 75
meeting between President Richard Nixon and Chinese leader Mao
Zedong in 1972. Since China has become a great power in Asia and
gradually eroded the leadership of the United States in this region
and the world, suspicion and tension between the two countries have
increased. Their difficult relationship has been further complicated
by the Obama administration’s new Asia strategy, i.e., the rebalancing
toward Asia, which Beijing largely regards as a strategy designed to
contain the rise of China. On the other hand, the PRC’s rapid military
modernization and assertive behavior in handling its territorial disputes
with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam in recent years have given
Washington reasons for concern. In addition, Xi’s emphasis on the
idea of the “China dream” since his inauguration has caught the at-
tention of the United States and other Asian countries. It was, therefore,
necessary for the two leaders to sincerely and effectively communicate
with each other in order to develop a stable and constructive rela-
tionship. Notably, the summit was designed to achieve that purpose.
The two presidents could meet at a retreat center and have plenty of
time to exchange opinions comfortably and privately.
At the opening of the summit, Obama and Xi made some sig-
nificant remarks. The American president stated that the United States
welcomes the rise of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous China. The
Chinese leader said that the PRC hopes the two nations can build a
new type of relationship between great powers.2 Their statements
epitomized the strategic stances of the two states. Washington wants
Beijing to believe that the United States has no intention to constrain
China’s ascendance as a global power and is more than willing to
cooperate with it.3 China wants to persuade the Americans that China
Chung Young-june, “China’s Great Power Mentality and Its Diplomatic Vision
for the 21st Century,” PacNet, No. 52R, August 1, 2013, CSIS, <http://csis.org/
files/publication/Pac1352R.pdf>.
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will rise peacefully and does not intend to challenge the primacy of
the United States in the international system, and that both countries
should put aside their differences and respect each other’s model of
development.4 Each side tried to send a clear signal to allay its
counterpart’s suspicions.
During the summit, both interlocutors raised their issues of con-
cern. The United States brought up questions regarding bilateral
trade, cyber-espionage, North Korean nuclear development, maritime
disputes in East Asia, climate change, and China’s human rights
record. The Chinese put the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan on
the table and addressed the issues advanced by the United States. As
expected, they converged on some issues and diverged on others.
After two days of talks, the summiteers agreed on the reduction of
hydrofluoro-carbons and the denuclearization of North Korea.5 By
contrast, there seemed to be little consensus on other problems. The
outcome of the summit substantially reflected the national interests
of the two countries. Indeed, climate change is a menace to all of
humankind. Over the last decade, China has been seriously hit by
numerous natural disasters that have caused many casualties and sub-
stantial damage. A nuclear-capable North Korea would be a looming
threat to South Korea, Japan, and the United States as well as China.
It would also create instability on the Korean Peninsula and could
Phillip C. Saunders, “The U.S. Isn’t Trying to Contain China...,” Foreign Policy,
August 23, 2013, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/23/the_united_
states_is_not_trying_to_contain_china>.
Brad Glosserman, “A ‘new type of great power relations’? Hardly,” PacNet,
No. 40, June 10, 2013, CSIS, <http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1340.pdf>.
Jackie Calmes & Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. and China Move Closer on North Korea,
but Not on Cyberespionage,” The New York Times, June 8, 2013, <http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/06/09/world/asia/obama-and-xi-try-building-a-new-model-for-
china-us-ties.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=1&>.
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prompt South Korea and Japan to “go nuclear.” For these reasons,
Beijing is willing to cooperate with the United States on the above-
mentioned two issues. Meanwhile, China can present itself as a re-
sponsible big power by helping to defuse global and regional threats.
Of late, cyber security has become a new concern for the United
States. Washington maintains that the Chinese have stolen many mili-
tary and business technologies through cyber-espionage. However,
China has refuted that accusation by claiming that China too is a
victim of cyber crimes. The two parties then decided to jointly tackle
this problem by setting up a task group during the U.S.-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue, which was scheduled to be held in July,
2013. As noted by Obama, the sources of cyber-intrusion could be
both state and non-state actors. Actually, it is true that both countries
have suffered cyber attacks from outside sources. Of course, Beijing
cannot admit that it has conducted cyber attacks against the United
States without jeopardizing its international image and bilateral re-
lations with Washington.6 Even though the territorial disputes in the
East and South China Seas have raised concerns about China’s sove-
reignty and strategic security, Beijing is likely to handle these disputes
peacefully in order not to feed the “China threat” argument. However,
the PRC will not refrain from taking concrete measures to protect
its core interests if they are, allegedly, violated by neighboring
countries. In any case, the divergence between the two sides regarding
this issue will continue.
China never fails to raise the issue of American arms sales to
Taiwan at its bilateral meetings with the United States.7 Nevertheless,
Oriana Skylar Mastro, “The Obama-Xi Summit: A New Era in Bilateral Rela-
tions?” The National Bureau of Asian Research, June 12, 2013, <http://www.nbr.
org/research/activity.aspx?id=345#.UjaJKuC74zY>.
Robert M. Hathaway, “Taiwan and Sunnylands: The Dog That Didn’t Bark,”
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at Sunnylands, Obama stated that the United States would continue
to adhere to its one China policy based on the three Joint Communiqués
and the Taiwan Relations Act. This means that Washington will keep
selling to Taipei weapons that the United States regards as necessary
for Taiwan’s defense. On the other hand, the White House expressed
its satisfaction with the improvement of cross-strait relations in recent
years.
In light of the process and the results achieved, it is fair to say
that the Sunnylands summit was moderately successful in promoting
U.S.-China relations. The two leaders moved one step further in their
effort to nurture mutual understanding and trust. Each side tried to
reduce the other’s suspicions. They agreed on some issues and still
diverged on many others. The Sunnylands summit was an effort on
the part of both sides to develop a positive and cooperative relationship.
II. The U.S.-Japan Joint Exercise
Since the Sunnylands summit, U.S.-China relations have deve-
loped with the same pattern of both conflict and cooperation. Days
after the summit, the United States and Japan conducted two weeks
of joint military exercises on California’s southern coast aimed at
improving Japan’s capability to defend remote islands.8 China quickly
concluded that the exercises were related to the dispute over the Dia-
oyutai Islands and asked that the exercises be cancelled. China’s Fo-
reign Ministry spokesman said: “We hope the relevant sides can focus
PacNet, No. 46, June 26, 2013, CSIS, <http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1346_0.
pdf>.
“Japan, U.S. start joint military drill,” UPI.com, June 10, 2013, <http://www.
upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/06/10/Japan-US-start-joint-military-drill/
UPI-63821370922780/>.
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on peace and stability in this region, and do more to contribute to
mutual trust and regional peace and stability.”9 Since the United
States has reiterated that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between Japan and the United States covers the Diaoyutai
Islands (which Japan calls the Senkaku Islands), it will help Japan
defend them if they are attacked by other nations.10 Beijing has also
claimed sovereignty over these islands. The tension between China
and Japan over these islands escalated after Japan nationalized them
in September 2012.11 Although the United States has said that it has
no specific position on the sovereignty of these disputed islands, it
has actually chosen sides by obliging itself to defend those islands
currently controlled by Japan. Beijing has criticized the U.S. policy
as interference in its sovereignty and proof that the United States
and Japan are cooperating in suppressing China. Obama and Xi dis-
cussed the Diaoyutai issue in their meeting at Sunnylands, and the
divergence in their views remained. The United States had expected
China to adopt peaceful measures in its dealings with Japan regarding
the territorial dispute. Beijing must have insisted that it was protecting
its territory and demanded that Japan restore the status quo by reversing
the nationalization measure.12
Associated Press, “Japanese troops head to California for military exercise with
US Marines,” Fox News, June 9, 2013, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/06/09/
japanese-troops-head-to-california-for-military-exercise-with-us-marines/>.
“Kerry Reaffirms Japan-US security pact covers Senkakus,” Daily Yomiuri,
February 23, 2013, <http://article.wn.com/view/2013/02/23/Kerry_reaffirms_
JapanUS_security_pact_covers_Senkakus/#/related_news>.
Robert Sutter & Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Shift to Toughness on Maritime
Claims－ One Year Later,” PacNet, No. 53, July 17, 2013, CSIS, <http://csis.
org/files/publication/Pac1353.pdf>.
“Beijing urges Senkaku nationalization reversal,” The Japan Times, March 10,
2013, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/10/national/beijing-urges-
senkaku-nationalization-reversal/#.UjNNQOC75q4>.
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Although the military drills must have been planned in advance,
conducting them immediately after the Sunnylands summit inevitably
aroused Beijing’s suspicions with regard to Washington’s intentions.
From the U.S. perspective, Japan is its most prominent ally, and China
is the emerging challenge in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. has to stick to
its alliance with Japan and strengthen that bilateral military relationship
in order to balance China’s military buildup in this region. Therefore,
it has to continue to conduct joint military exercises with Japan in
order to reinforce their military relationship. Even so, the most preferred
outcome for the United States is still to see the territorial dispute re-
solved peacefully.13 If China and Japan collide over the Diaoyutai
islands, the United States will be dragged into that conflict and will
clash militarily with China. Since the United States, China, and Japan
are the three major powers in the Asia-Pacific, a military conflict
among them will seriously disrupt the stability and prosperity of this
region. Therefore, the Obama administration has advised the two sides
to take mild measures toward each other to avoid conflict and resolve
the dispute through peaceful means.14 In order to reduce Beijing’s sus-
picions, the United States and Japan emphasized that the drills were
not aimed at any specific enemy country. However, considering the
goal and timing of the military exercise, it had to affect China’s trust
in the United States.
Richard C. Bush, “An American Perspective on Maritime Asia,” (address
prepared for delivery at the 2013 East China Sea Peace Forum), Brookings,
August 5, 2013, <http://www.brookings.edu/media/research/files/spee-
ches/2013/08/05%20american%20perspective%20maritime%20asia%
20bush/05%20american%20perspective%20maritime%20asia%20bush.pdf> .
Jacob M. Schlesinger & James T. Areddy, “Japan, China Inch Toward Repairing
Ties,” The Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2013, <http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887324354704578635560179835592.html?mod=rss_about_
china>.
U.S.-China Relations after the Obama-Xi Summit─A Perspective from Taiwan 81
III. The Snowden Episode
In June, 2013, Edward Snowden, a contractor for the National
Security Agency of the United States, leaked information to the
press revealing surveillance by the U.S. government of Internet and
telephone conversations around the world.15 Snowden’s disclosure
immediately caught the attention of the world and greatly embarrassed
the United States, which, during the Sunnylands summit, strongly
pushed China to respond to its concerns about cyber intrusions. Ac-
cording to Snowden, the United States had even conducted intensive
hacking attacks on Tsinghua University of China.16 Snowden’s sta-
tements proved two things. First, the United States had also conducted
cyber intrusions even though it had accused other nations of the
same misconduct. Second, China was also a victim of the United
States’ cyber-attacks. Snowden’s statements significantly diminished
the legitimacy of the U.S. demands that China stop cyber-attacks
against it. The cyber intrusions into China by the United States also
reduced Beijing’s trust in Washington.
The Snowden episode continued to develop when he appeared
in Hong Kong on June 9th, 2013, one day after the Sunnylands summit.
Snowden’s actions created a large problem for China. Everyone knew
that Hong Kong, where Snowdon was staying, was a special district
of the PRC and, therefore, that Beijing would make the final decision
on Snowden’s status.17 The U.S. government prosecuted Snowden
Jane Perlez & Keith Bradsher, “China Said to Have Made Call to Let Leaker
Depart,” The New York Times, June 23, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/06/24/world/asia/china-said-to-have-made-call-to-let-leaker-depart.
html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>.
“US made intensive hacking attacks on China: Edward Snowden,” The Economic
Times, June 23, 2013, <http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-06-23/
news/40147062_1_nsa-hacking-attacks>.
82 Prospect Journal No.10
and asked the Hong Kong government to return him to the U.S. for
trial and prevent him from leaking more information about U.S. in-
telligence activities. The Hong Kong government did not quickly
agree to the U.S. request to extradite Snowden. It was probably
waiting for Beijing’s direction. As for Beijing, if it continued to allow
Snowden to stay in Hong Kong, the Obama administration would be
very displeased with China, and the two countries’ relationship would
be damaged. On the other hand, Snowden’s information helped to
prove that China was also a victim of U.S. intelligent activities.18
Keeping Snowden outside the United States could help Beijing offset
the U.S. pressure on it to stop cyber intrusions and gain a favorable
chip in discussions with the United States on resolving that issue.19
Finally, Snowden left Hong Kong and flew to Moscow on June 23rd,
2013, to seek political asylum there. This outcome seemed to be the
best solution for Beijing. Allowing Snowden to leave Hong Kong
would stop the pressure from Washington to extradite him and would
help prevent Washington’s discontent with China from escalating.
By rejecting the U.S. request to extradite Snowden, China allowed
him to continue disclosing information regarding American intelligence
activities, further discrediting the United States. Beijing’s decision
to not keep Snowden in Hong Kong revealed that it did not want to
confront the United States directly so soon after the Sunnylands
summit ended. On the other hand, China’s refusal to extradite Snowden
also demonstrated that the two countries were still not very close,
“Edward Snowden was NSA Prism leak source－ Guardian,” BBC, June 10,
2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22836378>.
Jane Perlez & Keith Bradsher, “China Said to Have Made Call to Let Leaker
Depart.”
Jonathan Masters, “Extraditing Edward Snowden,” (Interview of Stephen I.
Vladeck), Council on Foreign Relations, June 28, 2013, <http://www.cfr.org/
united-states/extraditing-edward-snowden/p31029>.
U.S.-China Relations after the Obama-Xi Summit─A Perspective from Taiwan 83
and that there was an absence of trust between them. If Snowden
had hid among any U.S. allies, he would have already been extradited
to the United States. The Obama administration was still quite dis-
pleased with Beijing’s release of Snowden to Moscow. Secretary of
State John Kerry said that China’s decision to allow Snowden to
leave Hong Kong despite an arrest request from the United States
would have “an impact on the relationship, and consequences.” Presi-
dent Obama’s press secretary Jay Carney also expressed frustration
and disappointment with Hong Kong and China, and said that their
refusal to detain Snowden was a “serious setback” in relations.20
IV. The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) was
created during Obama’s first term and was designed to provide a
yearly opportunity for both sides to discuss cooperation on security
and economic issues. The fifth round of the S&ED began on July
10th, 2013, in Washington after the Sunnylands summit. Since Obama
and Xi agreed that many concrete issues would be negotiated during
the upcoming S&ED, many people watched the meeting closely to
examine the development of U.S.-China relations.
After two days of in-depth negotiations, the two sides reached
agreement on 91 bilateral issues involving regional and global chal-
lenges, cooperation between local governments, energy, environmental
protection, technology and agriculture, health and sanitation, and dia-
logue on science and technology.21 They also agreed to restart stalled
Peter Baker & Ellen Barry, “Leaker’s Flight Raises Tension Between U.S. and
3 Nations,” The New York Times, June 24, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/06/25/world/edward-snowden-nsa-surveillance-leak.html?partner=
rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=1&>.
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negotiations on an investment treaty that could significantly expand
business opportunities for both countries. Both sides agreed to establish
a stable and cooperative strategic security relationship.22 Therefore,
they decided to reinforce exchanges of high-ranking officials and to
engage in constant dialogue on issues of mutual concern. The two
sides also held the first meeting of the Cyber Working Group (CWG)
to discuss cyber-security and decided to conduct constant dialogue
on this issue as well. In order to upgrade the level of military co-
operation, both sides decided to actively explore a mechanism for
notifying each other of major military activities and agreed to continue
discussions on the rules of behavior for military air and maritime ac-
tivities. Both sides also agreed to create a hot line between the two
presidents’ special representatives to the S&ED in order to facilitate
communication.
These fruitful achievements proved that the two countries genu-
inely wanted to promote their bilateral relations. The agreements rea-
ched in the S&ED showed that the two countries shared many common
interests covering a large spectrum of issues. The officials of the two
countries were eager to implement the spirit of cooperation cultivated
by Obama and Xi during the Sunnylands summit.23 The United States
wanted to build up a balanced and beneficial U.S.-China relationship.
As for China, the S&ED provided a new way to engage in great
power relations. The two sides agreed that the engagements between
Office of the Spokesperson, “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue Out-
comes of the Strategic Track,” U.S. Department of State, July 12, 2013, <http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/07/211861.htm>.
Office of the Spokesperson, “U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
Outcomes of the Strategic Track.”
William J. Burns, Jacob Lew, & Yang Jiechi, “The U.S.-China Closing Statements
for U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue,” U.S. Department of Treasury,
July 11, 2013, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/2013/211850.htm>.
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high-ranking officials should continue since they were thought to in-
crease mutual understanding and trust. Most importantly, both sides
decided to improve military relations and enhance military cooperation.
The agreements to set up a hot line and explore the establishment of
a mechanism for notifying each other about major military activities
were Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), which would help to
uprade mutual trust at the military level. As agreed upon during the
Sunnylands summit, the two sides also held the first CWG meeting
during the S&ED to resolve the dispute over cyber-intrusions. Through
this type of channel, the United States and China can cooperate more
fully and find common interests that can provide a strong basis for
a peaceful relationship.
V. Taiwan’s International Participation
The Taiwan issue has long been a critical part of U.S.-China re-
lations. During the Sunnylands summit, Xi mentioned to Obama the
issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Taiwan’s international participation
also became a subject of dispute between the two countries following
the summit. The Republic of China (ROC) has long sought active
and appropriate participation in international organizations. As an
independent nation with strong economic performance and a developed
democracy, the ROC is well qualified to participate in international
organizations and make important contributions in international
affairs. However, the ROC’s international participation has not been
compatible with its strength due to the suppression by the PRC.
Beijing has insisted on the one China principle in handling foreign
relations. It has asserted that the PRC is the only representative of
China in the world and has opposed the ROC joining any international
organizations which require that members be sovereign states. As a
result, the ROC has been able to maintain memberships in only a
few international organizations. Nevertheless, since the early 1990s,
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Taiwan has endeavored to expand its international space by playing
an active role in the world and has enjoyed the benefits of participating
in international organizations.
Since Ma Ying-jeou took office as president in 2008, Taiwan
has made some progress in international participation as a result of
the improvement in cross-strait relations . Ma has proposed a diplomatic
truce across the strait and has taken a pragmatic approach to conducting
foreign policy. Taiwan has proposed that it be allowed to participate
in international organizations, especially those under the United Na-
tions, as a non-member. By making efforts to improve cross-strait
relations and by taking a pragmatic stance, Taiwan finally softened
the opposition from Beijing and succeeded in participating in the
World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer, beginning in 2009.
Since then, Taiwan has been able to attend the annual meetings.
Meanwhile, Taipei has made clear its intention to adopt the same ap-
proach to gain admittance to other UN specialized organizations and
has chosen the ICAO (International Civic Aviation Organization) and
UNFCCC (United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change)
as the next two priority targets. However, Beijing did not respond
positively to Taipei’s request until September, 2012, when PRC presi-
dent Hu Jintao met with Taiwan’s representative, the former vice
president Lien Chan, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation con-
ference (APEC). In that meeting, Hu promised to seriously study the
possibility of helping Taiwan participate in the ICAO in an appropriate
way.24 Hu’s statement seemed to indicate that Beijing would work
out a way for Taiwan to take part in the upcoming Assembly of the
ICAO, which was expected to be held in September, 2013.
“China signals support for Taiwan’s participation in ICAO,” Want China Times,
September 7, 2012, <http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?
id=20120907000084&cid=1101>.
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The United States has also actively supported Taiwan’s parti-
cipation in international organizations ever since it broke diplomatic
ties with Taiwan in 1979. It supported Taiwan’s participation in the
WHA and has also supported Taiwan’s bid to gain admittance to the
ICAO and UNFCCC. In June, 2013, the U.S. House of Representatives
passed a bill that required the Obama administration to support
Taiwan’s efforts to join the ICAO assembly as an observer.25 The
U.S. Senate then also passed a similar bill to express its support for
Taiwan’s participation in ICAO.26 Beijing strongly opposed these
steps by the U.S. Congress as interference in its sovereignty and
hoped that president Obama would veto the bill. Contrary to its ex-
pectation, Obama signed the bill into law and announced the United
States’ full support for Taiwan’s participation in international organi-
zations where statehood is not a requirement for membership.27 Since
Beijing has considered issues regarding Taiwan as involving its core
interests and has repeatedly warned the United States not to intervene
in these issues, Obama’s decision to sign the bill unquestionably an-
tagonized China. Commenting on Obama’s action, China’s Foreign
Ministry spokeswomen stated: “we urge the U.S. side to strictly fulfill
its commitment to the Chinese side on Taiwan-related issues, handle
those issues in a cautious and appropriate way, and stop interfering
in China’s internal affairs.”28 President Obama might have supported
William Lowther, “US House passes bill on ICAO bid,” Taipei Times, June 20,
2013, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/06/20/2003
565213>.
“United States Senate passes bill backing R.O.C. ICAO participation,” The
China Post, June 21, 2013, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/foreign-com-
munity/2013/06/21/381716/United-States.htm>.
Tony Liao, Angela Tsai, & Y. L. Kao, “U.S. president signs bill backing Taiwan’s
ICAO bid,” Focus Taiwan, July 13, 2013, <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/
aipl/201307130010.aspx>.
“China opposes U.S. legislation on Taiwan’s ICAO bid: spokeswoman,” People’s
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the bill for two reasons. First, supporting Taiwan’s international parti-
cipation had been a long-time U.S. policy and signing the bill
conformed to that policy. As U.S. president, he could not back down
from a legitimate stance and antagonize Congress in response to pres-
sure from China. Secondly, it was speculated that he had been dis-
pleased with Beijing’s handling of the Snowden case and thus de-
liberately supported the bill to retaliate against China. No matter why
he decided to support the bill, it definitely reduced Beijing’s trust in
the United States.
VI. China’s Defense Minister Visiting the United States
China’s new Defense Minister Chang Wanquan visited the United
States in mid August, 2013. He first arrived in Hawaii and met with
the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Lock-
lear. Then he flew to Washington and was received by U.S. Secretary
of Defense Chuck Hagel and new National Security Advisor Susan
Rice, respectively. After meeting with Hagel, both sides agreed to
hold a joint anti-piracy exercise near Somalia’s waters and a joint
humanitarian rescue exercise near Hawaii. As for engagements
between high-ranking military officials, both sides agreed that U.S.
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno and U.S. Air Force
Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh will visit China this year. The PLAN
Commander, Admiral Wu Shengli, will also visit the United States
by the end of 2013. In 2014, Secretary Hagel will pay his first visit
to China since taking office. Hagel and Chang also discussed the
North Korean nuclear issue, and both sides agreed that North Korea
should stop developing nuclear weapons. They also discussed the
issue of cyber-security and agreed to tackle it together. Both sides
Daily online, July 16, 2013, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/8328984.
html>.
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also agreed to set up a task group to work on other issues of mutual
concern.
The visit by Chang to the United States was an extension of the
cooperation promoted by Obama and Xi during the Sunnylands sum-
mit. For China, it is the military dimension of the new type of great
power relations. The major purpose of Chang’s trip to the United
States was to promote this new type of military relations between
the two countries.29 As for the United States, the trip was meant to
enhance mutual understanding, trust, and cooperation between the two
countries’ armies.30 Therefore, the United States has actively promoted
mutual visits of high-ranking military officials, joint exercises, and
CBMs between the two countries. In order to enhance mutual trust,
the United States purposefully arranged for Chang to visit the U.S.
Northern Command located in Colorado. This was the first time a
high-ranking Chi-nese military official visited such an important mili-
tary institute. The U.S. also reaffirmed its invitation to the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) to participate for the first time in the Rim of
Pacific Exercise (RIM PAC) in 2014, a U.S.-led joint exercise of navies
from more than 20 Asia-Pacific countries. In the joint press conference,
Secretary Hagel stated that both sides wanted to build up a sustained
and substantive military-to-military relationship and to enhance the
connection between the two largest economies in the world.31
Chen Weihua & Zhao Yanrong, “China defense chief in DC,” China Daily,
August 19, 2013, <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/2013-08/19/content_16903777.
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However, divergence and mistrust still remained after the meeting.
In the press conference, Chang stated that the enhancement of military
capabilities by the United States through joint military exercises with
its allies had complicated the security situation in the Asia-Pacific, and
that he hoped that the goal of the United States’ rebalancing strategy
was not to weaken China.32 The United States had advertised that its re-
balancing strategy was not meant to contain China. Chang’s statements
revealed that Beijing, nevertheless, still had reservations about U.S.
intentions. As for the disputes over the East China Sea and South
China Sea, their stances also remained different. Hagel told Chang
that the United States had no specific stance on the sovereignty
disputes in these areas but insisted on their peaceful resolution. Chang
replied that China would not trade its core interests with other
countries, and that no one should underestimate China’s resolution
to defend its territorial and maritime so vereignty.33 Chang’s reply
revealed that China would continue its assertive actions vis-à-vis
Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.34 Concerning Internet security,
Chang repeated Xi’s stance during the Sunnylands summit that China
was also a victim of Internet attacks and opposed any double standard
on this issue.
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Not surprisingly, Chang again raised the issue of U.S. arms sales
to Taiwan during his meeting with his U.S. counterpart. However, it
has surprised Taiwan and many observers that Chang, in his talk with
Hagel, stated that China was willing to adjust its cross-strait military
deployment if the United States would cease selling weapons to
Taiwan.35 According to the Chinese official, Xi had also suggested
a similar deal to Obama, but the U.S. side did not accept it. Beijing
has considered the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as serious interference
in its sovereignty and a major obstacle to its unification with Taiwan.
It has tried every means to halt U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. It was
obvious that China was trying to utilize the improved U.S.-China
military relations to influence U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.36 However,
the Obama administration turned down this proposal again.37 The
State Department quickly made it clear that the United States would
stick to its one China policy and continue to sell defensive weapons
deemed necessary to Taiwan according to the Taiwan Relations Act.
The Obama administration made that decision for several reasons.
First, the decision on whether to sell weapons to Taiwan was a matter
of U.S. policy and should not be influenced by China. Secondly, the
U.S. would lose credit in the eyes of its Asian allies if it traded with
China on arms sales to Taiwan. Thirdly, the Obama administration
truly believes that providing defensive weapons will help protect Tai-
wan’s security and enhance its confidence in engaging with China.
“Beijing urges US to stop arms sales to Taiwan,” Want China Times, August
23, 2013, <http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?
id=20130823000080&cid=1101>.
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The U.S. response surely disappointed Beijing and will continue to
impede the development of U.S.-China relations.
However, the Chinese official conveyed that Beijing still con-
sidered Chang’s visit to the United States as successful because it
led to concrete cooperation and provided China with an opportunity
to reiterate its thoughts on the major obstacles to U.S.-China relations.
VII. Evaluating the U.S.-China Relations after the Summit
The meeting between Obama and Xi at Sunnylands revealed their
intention to improve and strengthen U.S.-China relations. The emerging
China has really constituted a challenge to the leadership status of the
United States and the security situation in the Asia-Pacific. Even so,
the countries do not want conflict with each other.38 China is still a
developing country and has a lot of domestic problems that need to
be solved. Its military capability is also much weaker than that of
the United States. As for the United States, it needs to strengthen its
stagnant economy and handle many international issues, for example,
the recovery of the global economy, the North Korean nuclear threat,
international terrorism, the Syria crisis, and other non-traditional
threats. As long as China does not deliberately challenge U.S. leadership
or change the status quo, the United States need not contain or suppress
it. The United States wants to have a peaceful and cooperative relationship
with China even under its rebalancing strategy.39 In a word, the two
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large countries have no intention to be each other’s enemies since
the cost of conflict is too high to be afforded. Therefore, the two
leaders held a summit to fully exchange views on their bilateral
relations and international affairs, hoping to increase mutual under-
standing, trust, and cooperation. Even though they intended to create
a positive relationship, they were constrained by objective differences
in ideology, security strategy, and national interests between the two
countries.40 The Sunnylands summit only achieved the goal of ex-
changing viewpoints, increasing mutual understanding and limited
trust, and arriving at some cooperation. The divergence between the
two countries was not completely resolved, and trust between them
was also not fully created.
U.S.-China relations since the Sunnylands summit have exhibited
the same tendency. The S&ED and its abundant outcomes showed
that the two countries share many interests and are very willing to
realize those interests through expanded cooperation. The continuous
mutual visits between high-ranking military officials, including the
recent visit by Chang Wanquan to the United States, have shown that
the two counties are enhancing military relations, which are a critical
part of the cooperative relations between the two countries. The de-
crease in their strategic suspicion and increase in military trust will
substantively help to stabilize and improve U.S.-China relations. The
continuous joint exercises conducted by the United States and its
allies including Japan have revealed that the Obama administration
still considers China as a potential competitor in the Asia-Pacific.
Richard Weitz, “New Chinese Thinking on Sino-U.S. Relations?” China Brief,
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The Obama administration has been conducting a hedge strategy to
deal with a rising China. The United States has to strengthen military
cooperation with its allies in order to balance China’s rising military
power and engage with it at the same time.41 Regarding the territorial
disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, the United
States basically has stood with its allies by proclaiming that a peaceful
resolution must be achieved. However, China has considered those
disputed territories as its core interests and will take necessary
measures to safeguard them. The two countries will inevitably confront
each other on these issues. The Taiwan issue has also constituted a
similar challenge for U.S.-China relations. The United States’ support
for Taiwan’s international participation and arms sales to Taiwan will
remain challenges to China’s core interests. The United States will
continue to implement its one China policy and will inevitably have
friction with China over Taiwan. The Snowden episode has revealed
that each side still captures required information from the other
through the Internet. The cyber-intrusion issue remains a sensitive
issue that needs to be resolved by the two countries.
In sum, U.S.-China relations and trust have been improving
gradually since the Sunnylands summit. However, many divergences
between the two sides still exist and need to be overcome. Since
these disputes are not easy to solve quickly, their relations will
continue to be cooperative, competitive, and sometimes confrontational.
As for Taiwan’s interests, it should welcome the U.S. rebalancing
strategy because it will enhance stability and security in the Asia-
Pacific, and should continue to strengthen U.S.-Taiwan relations. Tai-
wan need not oppose the improvement in U.S.-China relations, but
Ryan McClure, “A New Type of U.S.-China Military Relationship,” The
Diplomat, September 11, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/china-power/a-new-
type-of-us-china-military-relationship>.
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it should let the two countries know that this improvement should
not be achieved at the expense of its interests.
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